The parties' primary area of contention relative to class certification concerns the issues of commonality and predominance. In its first three issues, SWEPI challenges the Commission's final orders under the APA. ; see also Tex. Based upon the foregoing events and averments, Walney commenced this putative class action in the Venango County Court of Common Pleas, asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, disparagement of title, and promissory estoppel. failing to consider class certification of individual claims." Once you create your profile, you will be able to: Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work. of Eric Jenevein ¶1, ECF No. Administrative Appeal of Commission's Final Orders. See Tex. Res. Gen. Laws 1616, 1616. After a hearing, the district court denied SWEPI's request and abated this cause until the Commission entered its final orders. SWEPI urges that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority because chapter 92's plain language does not authorize the Commission to consider or approve two contiguous 640-acre qualified subdivisions on a single parcel of land for the single purpose of landfill operations. The drafts were payable through SWEPI's bank, Amegy Bank N.A. Defendants contend that Count I is unsuitable for classwide resolution because individualized inquiry is necessary in order to determine, in any particular case, whether an enforceable promise to pay a bonus was made, whether nonpayment actually constituted a breach of SWEPI's alleged payment obligations, whether and to what extent injury resulted to the individual lessors as a result of nonpayment, or whether performance (meaning payment) was otherwise excused. § 92.004(a) (commission charged with adopting rules). Moreover, if the court adopts plaintiffs' proposed construction of the agreement, plaintiffs will be able to establish liability on a classwide basis by virtue of nonpayment alone. "); Public Util. As previously discussed, numerous issues of law presently exist which are common to the class in that they arise from materially identical form documents and a common course of conduct on the part of SWEPI relative to its lease acquisition process. § 2001.174(2)(A)-(F) (West 2008); An administrative agency "has only those powers that the Legislature expressly confers upon it" and "any implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the express responsibilities given to it by the Legislature. Nat. This does not necessarily mean that they are from outside the United States. Here, there is no challenge to the adequacy of putative class counsel; however, defendants contend that the named plaintiffs are inadequate representatives because both Walney and Bedow testified to facts at odds with the legal theories they are trying to advance on behalf of the class and because they failed to display the knowledge required of a class representative. 3d 329, 357 (W.D.N.Y. On August 8, 2019, Occidental acquired Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. Each operations site must have at least two acres and each separate 80 acres must have at least one operations site. Code § 3.76(a)(4)(B); see also Tex. Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to certain bonus monies under the terms of their respective leases, which were never paid. "'To show a breach of contract, a party must establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) resultant damages.'" Neither case addressed the issue raised by the Commission here — whether asserted declaratory claims were redundant of the issues and available remedies in a parallel administrative appeal. Accordingly, the court finds that the typicality requirement is satisfied relative to Counts I and I(A). Pa. Jan. 26, 2015) (stating "there is no fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Range; rather it is contractual"); Healy v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. Res. Opp. Plaintiffs contend that their fraud claim should be certified because it arises from a common course of conduct whereby SWEPI deceptively "obtain[ed] execution and possession of the Lease by creating the false pretense that the landowner would be paid the Signing Bonus." Royal Mile Co., Inc. v. UPMC, 40 F. Supp. § 92.004(b); 16 Tex. Plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of that presumption here. 1.) They point to the lawsuits commenced in state court by Mr. Altomare's clients and note that the amounts in controversy are sufficient to support those individual suits without the need for a class action. 2005). SWEPI urges that the plain meaning of "not more than 640 acres" in the definition of "qualified subdivision" in section 92.002(3) and rule 76(a)(4) is as a statutory cap or "absolute limit" on the amount of acres that can be approved as a qualified subdivision on a single parcel of land. SWEPI represents that it has analyzed all the 2,649 drafts that potentially fall within the proposed class definition. Because plaintiffs also alleged that the MOLs were recorded without the lessor's knowledge or permission (SAC ¶ 36), case-specific inquiries will need to be made concerning this point. Consequently, this court finds that the numerosity requirement is satisfied. ("Community Bank III"), No. Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 31-32 (Pa. Super. (Decl. Id. But section 92.004(b) authorizes the Commission itself to amend a plat prior to approval and section 92.006 expressly allows a surface owner to abandon, replat, or amend any portion of a subdivision as long as the amendment or replatting is approved by the Commission. Accordingly, the court finds that the named plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the putative class relative to Counts I and I(A).

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